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Abstract 
Mental simulations of future experiences are often concerned with emotionally 
arousing events. Although it is widely believed that mental simulations enhance future 
behavior, virtually nothing is known about the mnemonic fate of these simulations over 
time or whether emotional simulations are especially well-remembered. We used a novel 
paradigm, combining recently developed methods for generating future event simulations 
and well-established memory testing procedures, to examine the retention of positive, 
negative, and neutral simulations over multiple delays. We found that with increasing 
delay, details associated with negative simulations become more difficult to remember 
than details associated with positive and neutral simulations. We suggest that these delay-
by-emotion interactions reflect the mnemonic influence of fading affect bias, where 
negative reactions fade more quickly than positive ones, resulting in a tendency to 
remember a rosy simulated future. We also discuss implications for affective disorders 
such as depression and anxiety. 
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Over the last several years, research from a diverse set of perspectives – ranging 
from cognitive and social psychology to psychopathology and neuropsychology as well 
as cognitive and affective neuroscience – has revealed that memory plays an important 
role in mentally simulating future events (for reviews, see Schacter, Addis, & Buckner, 
2008; Szpunar, 2010). For example, many brain regions that support remembering past 
events are similarly involved during simulation of possible future events (e.g., Addis, 
Wong, & Schacter, 2007; Okuda et al., 2003; Szpunar, Watson, & McDermott, 2007).  
This growing literature has highlighted the adaptive value of memory in allowing 
us to prepare for the future (Schacter & Addis, 2007; Suddendorf & Corballis, 2007). But 
little is known about the functional significance of simulating future events, including the 
fate of simulated future events over time: is there any benefit to remembering the details 
of simulated future events that may or may not come to pass? Ingvar (1985) suggested 
that such “memories for the future” represent an important adaptation: remembering 
planned actions, reactions, and the like makes future behavior more efficient. Indeed, the 
little data available suggest that simulated future events are well remembered (Klein, 
Robertson, & Delton, 2010; McDonough & Gallo, 2010). Nonetheless, simulations of the 
future can take many forms and, to our knowledge, no study has examined whether 
certain kinds of simulations are better remembered than others. 
One important characteristic of a future simulation concerns whether or not the to-
be-simulated event is emotionally arousing. D’Argembeau, Renaud, and Van der Linden 
(2010) reported that nearly two-thirds of everyday future thoughts are emotionally 
charged (i.e., positive or negative). Moreover, these emotional simulations were rated 
higher in terms of personal importance than non-emotional simulations. Given the 
Memory for emotional simulations 4 
frequency and importance of emotional simulations, a critical and as yet unexplored 
question concerns whether emotional simulations are remembered especially well over 
time compared with neutral simulations, and therefore potentially more available to 
influence future behavior. No data exist that address this issue. While the literature on 
emotion and memory generally supports the idea that positive and negative events are 
better remembered than neutral events (for reviews, see Kensinger, 2009, Phelps, 2006), 
there are conditions in which emotional arousal can impair memory (Kensinger, 2009; 
Mather & Sutherland, 2011).  
Moreover, few studies have examined the fate of emotional memories at multiple 
points in time, and those that have provide the basis for competing predictions. On the 
side of future utility, some types of negative stimuli (e.g., highly arousing words or 
photos) are more resistant to forgetting than neutral stimuli (e.g., non-arousing words or 
photos; e.g., Sharot & Phelps, 2004; Sharot & Yonelinas, 2008). Conversely, from the 
standpoint of psychological well-being (Taylor, 1991), the affect associated with negative 
experiences tends to fade more quickly than it does for positive experiences (for review, 
see Walker & Skowronski, 2009). Although it is unclear whether this “fading affect bias” 
represents a loss in memory for details associated with negative experiences, conditions 
exist in which negative experiences are remembered less well over time than positive 
experiences (Holmes, 1970; see also Stagner, 1931; Thompson, 1930). 
We set out to (1) directly examine, for the first time, the relative memorability of 
positive, negative, and neutral simulated future events, and (2) present a new paradigm 
for approaching such questions that combines recently developed methods for generating 
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future event simulations (Addis et al., 2009, 2010) with well-established memory testing 
procedures. 
Experiments 1a and 1b 
METHOD 
Participants 
Forty-eight Boston University students were recruited via the Boston University 
Job Service and provided informed written consent in a manner approved by the Harvard 
Institutional Review Board. 
Stimulus collection and preparation 
One week before the future simulation session, participants visited the laboratory 
and generated a set of 110 familiar people, places, and objects. Participants in Experiment 
1a accomplished this task via an adapted version of the experimental recombination 
procedure (Addis et al., 2009, 2010). This procedure required participants to generate a 
list of 110 personal memories from the last ten years of their lives that were specific in 
time and place and that lasted no more than one day. For each memory, participants 
provided a brief description that included: a person other than themselves, the location 
where the event occurred, and a salient object (Table 1a). Each person, place, and object 
could only be mentioned once in the context of the entire set of 110 memories. 
Participants were provided with an extensive list of common experiences to help them 
generate these memories. To ensure that generation of personal memories did not 
interfere with later memory for future simulations, participants in Experiment 1b listed 
the names of 110 familiar people (using their Facebook friends list), places, and objects 
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without reactivating detailed personal memories. The stimulus collection phase lasted 
approximately two (Experiment 1b) to three (Experiment 1a) hours. 
The resulting lists of 110 familiar people, places, and objects were subsequently 
examined for quality and the 93 best examples were selected and randomly recombined 
in a manner such that 93 simulation cues (i.e., novel arrangements of person, place, and 
object) were created (lower panels of Table 1b). 
Simulation 
One week later, participants returned to simulate 30 positive, 30 negative, and 30 
neutral future events (presented in random order). Each trial consisted of a simulation cue 
(person, place, and object; lower panels of Table 1b) that was accompanied by one of 
three emotional tags (positive, negative, or neutral; upper panels of Table 1b). In each 
instance, participants were allotted 12.5 seconds to generate a plausible future event that 
might take place within the next 5 years and that would evoke the emotion indicated by 
the emotional tag. After each trial, participants rated the simulation they had generated on 
a series of three five-point scales and had five seconds to make each rating: (1) valence (1 
= very negative, 5 = very positive), (2) arousal (1 = very exciting, 5 = very relaxing), and 
(3) detail (1 = few details, 5 = many details). The order of ratings was counterbalanced 
across participants for a total of six possible orders. To ensure that participants 
understood all instructions and that they simulated future events within the stipulated 
time period, three practice trials were completed, during which participants were asked to 
describe the content of their simulations to the experimenter. During experimental trials, 
no verbal descriptions were collected so as to make the task of engaging in mental 
simulation as natural as possible. Importantly, after the experimental trials, all 
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participants reported that their simulations were novel (i.e., they had not thought about or 
experienced them before). Study materials were presented via E-Prime 1.0 software on a 
Dell desktop computer and participants made their responses (valence, arousal, and detail 
ratings) using a keyboard. The simulation phase lasted approximately 40 minutes. 
Test 
Immediately following the simulation phase, participants worked through a set of 
logic puzzles for ten minutes and were told that they would complete an additional set of 
simulation trials after the puzzles or one day later (between-participants; crossed with 
method of stimulus collection). Subsequently, participants were presented with a surprise 
cued recall memory test. None of the participants reported expecting this test. The test 
consisted of 90 trials. On each trial, one detail (i.e., person, place, or object) of a 
previously encountered simulation cue was missing and participants were asked to think 
back to the future event they had generated and fill in the missing detail (Table 1c; cf. 
Jones, 1976). Each detail was missing an equal number of times for cues that had 
previously been associated with positive, negative, and neutral simulations (emotion tags 
were not re-presented during testing). Participants were told that they were allowed to 
produce guesses, but only if they were reasonably certain of the correct answer. Test 
materials were presented via E-Prime 1.0 software on a Dell desktop computer and 
participants made their responses using a keyboard. The test phase was self-paced and 
lasted approximately 30 minutes. 
RESULTS 
Phenomenological Ratings 
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Table 2 summarizes the phenomenological ratings for positive, negative, and 
neutral simulations. Ratings did not differ as a function of experiment (1a or 1b) or delay 
(largest Z = 1.73; Mann-Whitney U tests) and so are collapsed across these factors. 
Friedman tests demonstrated that valence, detail, and arousal ratings differed significantly 
as a function of emotion, χ2(2) = 92.17, P < .001, χ2(2) = 27.83, P < .001, and χ2(2) = 
60.76, P < .001, respectively. Wilcoxon sign tests further showed that: (1) positive and 
negative simulations were respectively rated as more positive (Z = 6.03, P < .001) and 
negative (Z = 6.03, P < .001) than neutral simulations; (2) positive simulations were rated 
as more detailed than negative (Z = 3.68, P < .001) and neutral (Z = 5.26, P < .001) 
simulations, and negative simulations were rated as more detailed than neutral 
simulations (Z = 2.06, P = .04); and (3) negative simulations were rated as more arousing 
than positive (Z = 5.76, P < .001) and neutral (Z = 6.00, P < .001) simulations, whereas 
positive and neutral simulations did not differ in this regard (Z = 1.03, P = .30). 
Memory performance 
Cued recall performance was subjected to a 2 (experiment) x 2 (delay) x 3 
(emotion) x 3 (cue-type) mixed ANOVA, with experiment and delay entered as between-
subject factors and emotion and cue-type entered as within-subject factors. 
For the between-subject factors: (1) there was no main effect of experiment, 
F(1,44) = 1.10, p = .30; (2) there was a main effect of delay, F(1,44) = 31.33, p < .001, 
ηp2 = .42, such that simulations were better remembered after ten minutes (M = .63) than 
after one day (M = .32); and (3) there was no experiment-by-delay interaction (F < 1). 
For the within-subject factors: (1) there was a main effect of emotion, F(2,88) = 
7.36, p = .001, ηp2 = .14, and post-hoc paired-samples t-tests showed that positive 
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simulations (M = .51) were better remembered than negative (M = .46), t(47) = 2.90, p = 
.006, d = .42, and neutral (M = .46), t(47) = 3.66, p = .001, d = .53, simulations; (2) there 
was a main effect of cue-type, F(2,88) = 48.36, p < .001,  ηp2 = .53, and post-hoc paired-
samples t-tests showed that participants performed best when cued to remember people 
(M = .58) as opposed to objects (M = .43), t(47) = 7.70, p < .001, d = 1.12, and places (M 
= .42), t(47) = 9.53, p < .001, d = 1.38; and (3) there was no emotion-by-cue-type 
interaction, F (4,176) = 1.65, p = .17. 
Importantly, for interactions among between- and within-subject factors, only 
delay interacted with emotion, F(2,88) = 7.73, p < .001, ηp2 = .15 (see Figure 1; notably, 
this interaction was similar for participants in Experiments 1a and 1b, suggesting that the 
reactivation of personal memories had little or no influence on later memory for 
simulations of future events). This interaction was further characterized by three 
additional 2 (delay) x 2 (emotion) mixed ANOVAs and their associated paired-samples t-
tests which demonstrated that: (1) there was a significant interaction between positive and 
negative simulations, F(1,46) = 4.94, p = .031, ηp2 = .10, such that positive and negative 
simulations were remembered equally well after ten minutes and negative simulations 
were remembered worse after one day, t(23) = 3.68, p = .001, d = .80; (2) there was a 
significant interaction between negative and neutral simulations, F(1,46) = 16.80, p < 
.001, ηp2 = .27, such that negative simulations were remembered better than neutral 
simulations after ten minutes, t(23) = 2.74, p = .012, d = .57, but worse after one day, 
t(23) = 3.17, p = .004, d = .69; and (3) there was no interaction between positive and 
neutral simulations, F(1,46) = 2.28, p = .14 (although positive simulations were 
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remembered better than neutral simulations after ten minutes, t(23) = 4.21, p < .001, d = 
.88). All other higher-order interactions were non-significant (all but one F < 1). 
DISCUSSION 
The experiments reported here demonstrate that, over time, details associated with 
negative simulations of future events become more difficult to remember than details 
associated with positive and neutral simulations. The present data fit well with previous 
studies showing that emotional reactions fade more quickly for negative than positive life 
experiences. Although most demonstrations of this fading affect bias lack objective 
measures of memory (for discussion, see Walker & Skowronski, 2009), there is 
experimental evidence that negative experiences are sometimes remembered less well 
over time than positive experiences (Holmes, 1970; Stagner, 1931; Thompson, 1930). 
Why are details associated with simulations of negative future events difficult to 
remember over time? We suggest a hypothesis that links fading affect bias with binding 
of, and memory for, event details. Mather and colleagues have argued that emotional 
arousal facilitates binding of event details when people attempt to integrate those details 
into a coherent mental representation (for review, see Mather & Sutherland, 2011). 
Extending this proposal, we suggest that the affect associated with a mental simulation of 
a future event serves to link together the components of that simulation. As the affective 
component dissipates, so too does the integrity of the associated mental simulation. If, as 
shown by work on fading affect bias, negative affect fades more quickly over time than 
positive affect, then negative simulations should be more adversely affected by retention 
interval than positive or neutral simulations.1 
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While this account fits well with the results of the present experiments, it remains 
to be determined how broadly the hypothesis can be extended. For example, it is unclear 
how the present hypothesis could explain why traumatic experiences are resistant to 
forgetting (Porter & Peace, 2007). Moreover, simulations of emotional future events 
often have to do with the distant future (e.g., retirement) and it will be interesting to test 
whether a similar pattern of data emerges using extended time intervals. Finally, although 
participants were instructed to simulate future events at encoding and think back to those 
simulations at retrieval, associations among person-place-object cues formed during 
encoding probably influenced memory performance.  
Nonetheless, the present data fit nicely into theories that emphasize the 
importance of adaptive cognitive processes that promote psychological well-being 
(Taylor, 1991). With respect to future-directed cognition, healthy adults often think about 
their futures in an overly positive light (Sharot, Riccardi, Raio, Phelps, 2007; Weinstein, 
1980). The present data suggest that optimistic views of the future can conspire with 
fading affect bias such that the “remembered future” is extremely rosy. In light of these 
considerations, studies examining memory for emotional simulations in patients with 
affective disorders, such as depression and anxiety, would be of considerable interest. 
Previous studies have revealed that future simulations tend to be negatively biased in 
such patients (e.g., MacLeod, Tata, Kentish, & Jacobsen, 1997; Williams et al., 1996), 
but nothing is known about the nature of patients’ memories for those simulations. 
Understanding when the remembered future is rosy and not-so-rosy should increase our 
understanding of the relations among emotion, memory, and future thinking. 
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Footnote 
1 Although neutral simulations may not have benefitted from strong emotional arousal 
after a short delay, the positively biased nature of neutral simulations may have benefitted 
their long-term retention relative to negative simulations.  
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Table 1. 
Experimental design for Experiments 1a and 1b. 
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Table 2. 
Phenomenological Ratings for Experiments 1a and 1b. 
  Positive  Negative  Neutral 
Valence  4.11 (0.30)  1.89 (0.51)  3.22 (0.38) 
Detail  3.79 (0.46)  3.58 (0.56)  3.45 (0.61) 
Arousal  2.91 (0.63)  1.97 (0.46)  2.97 (0.31) 
 
Note. Standard deviations are presented in parentheses. 
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Figure Caption 
Figure 1. Cued recall memory performance for Experiments 1a and 1b. Left panel 
presents delay-by-emotion interaction collapsed across both experiments. Right panels 
demonstrate consistency of the delay-by-emotion interaction in both experiments. 
